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The objective of this study was to examine concussion reporting and safeguarding policy in British 29 
American Football (BAF). Data were collected via an online survey tool. The data presented are part of 30 
a broader study that examined the injury profiles, reporting concussion behaviours and medical 31 
provision in BAF. When asked about overall playing experience, concussion like symptoms were found 32 
in over half (58.8%) of participants. Of those, 36.4% reported they had previously been formally 33 
diagnosed with a concussion whilst playing BAF. Just under half of participants (44.7%) had suspected 34 
they’d had a concussion, although this was not formally diagnosed, and 23.5% of participants had 35 
previously hidden concussion symptoms. Fifty eight percent of teams reported they did not have a 36 
regular game day medic, with a range of hired medical personnel who attended games. Prominent 37 
barriers to consistent medical hire included; budget, institutional barriers, lack of medic reliability and 38 
game knowledge. BAF is a developing sport with a clear vision for growth of participation. Yet, the 39 
current concussion and medical provision policy do not address the sport’s welfare needs. Through 40 
discussion of these policies in the context of this study’s findings, we highlight vital areas for concern 41 
in policy and practice that the British American Football Association need to address in their medical 42 






















American football (AF) is one of the most popular sports in the United States (US) with approximately 63 
5.16 million tackle players and 6.57 million non-contact flag football players in 2018 (Statista, 2021). 64 
The sport regularly attracts numbers of around 500,000 spectators per team across the National Football 65 
League (NFL) season (Statista, 2021). In the United Kingdom (UK), the game is less popular, yet 66 
growing. According to the UK national governing body, the British American Football Association 67 
(BAFA), there were 462 registered teams in the 2019/20 season. 68 
American Football was first popularised in the UK in the early 1980s (Maguire., 2011) and soon a 69 
league was developed under the title of the American Football League (UK) (Needham., nd), which 70 
was replaced by BAFA in 2010 (Crawford., 2016). AF was first played at university level in 1985 as a 71 
four team league (Bayram et al., 2020). Since this time, the game is now played under the British 72 
Universities and Colleges Sport (BUCS) umbrella. In the 2019/20 season this league encompassed over 73 
80 teams (BUCS, 2021).  74 
Following recent changes to the governance of BAFA a ‘10-year vision to professionalise British 75 
American football and inspire people to play the game’ was outlined (BAFA, 2020). This vision 76 
statement includes (but is not limited to); ‘accessible, inclusive, safe and enjoyable’ participation 77 
growth across all levels, long term athlete development and supporting the quality and quantity of game 78 
day staff (BAFA, 2020). As part of this professionalisation, BAFA have developed a number of policies, 79 
including medical provision and concussion policies to support the safe participation of players. 80 
The 2017 medical policy for tackle AF highlights 5 key areas for minimum standards:  81 
1) the professional body the first aider is registered to,  82 
2) the first aider should not be a team member,  83 
3) a risk assessment should be carried out by the first aider,  84 
4) a ‘suitable’ first aid kit which is ‘approved by the professional practitioner’ must be available  85 
5) a telephone with signal should be available.  86 
The policy states that these are minimum medical guidelines for teams to manage. Games will be 87 
suspended if these guidelines are not met. Additionally, BAFA’s concussion policy states it is the shared 88 
responsibility of player, coaches and club management to oversee the recovery of an athlete following 89 
a concussion. 90 
Unlike in the US where players are brought up playing the game from a young age (Findler, 2015), few 91 
UK athletes begin playing AF until later into their teens or early adulthood. Indeed, in their review of 92 
UK BUCS AF player injuries, Bayram et al (2020) found 39.5% of players had no playing experience 93 
before the season began, and over 80% of athletes started playing the sport at university that year. One 94 
potential risk of limited knowledge and experience of playing the game is increased injury incidence 95 
requiring medical intervention. Bayram et al. (2020) have reported that UK university AF injuries to be 96 
comparably different to US collegiate football athletes. Specifically, UK university players were found 97 
to have greater risk of concussion and more severe injuries. Running backs and line-backers were found 98 
to have the highest injury rates, potentially due to their involvement in high-speed tackles (Ward et al., 99 
2018; Edwards et al., 2018). Moreover, injury rates in offensive and defensive linemen were 100 
proportionally higher than US collegiate athletes (Bayram et al., 2020; Badgeley et al., 2013; Dompier 101 
et al., 2015). It is proposed that these findings are due to small roster sizes found in the UK game, thus 102 
meaning more game time for individuals. Furthermore, the provision of strength and conditioning, 103 
funding, coaching, officiating and medical facilities are far from comparable to that of the US sport 104 
(Bayram et al., 2020). 105 
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AF exposes athletes to frequent collisions and high-velocity movement, placing the athlete at 106 
considerable risk of both musculoskeletal (MSK) injury and head injuries (Edwards et al., 2018). For 107 
example, during the 2019 NFL preseason and regular season there were 224 diagnosed concussions 108 
(Battista., 2020) and during the 2012 and 2013 seasons 262 concussions were reported in collegiate 109 
players (Dompier et al., 2015). Comparably, Bayram et al (2020) reported 3 times the risk of concussion 110 
in UK university football to collegiate football in the USA.  However, due to a significant shortfall of 111 
research in the British game, we do not know the extent of injuries within British American Football 112 
(BAF) across all levels. More importantly, our knowledge of reporting behaviours, injury profiles, 113 
physiological demands, injury management protocols and knowledge of these protocols among BAF 114 
players and staff continues to be sparse. As such, the concussion incidence rate could be higher. The 115 
tendency for players to under-report injury (Kroshus et al., 2015; Cranmer and LaBelle, 2018) is 116 
particularly concerning in light of the emergence of Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy (CTE) as a 117 
potential long term effect of concussion (Omalu et al., 2010) and second-impact syndrome, the 118 
consequence of a second head impact which can lead to severe neurological consequences, and even 119 
death (Jordan 2013). 120 
Concern for the secondary effects of concussion have led to increased scrutiny from key game 121 
stakeholders regarding the safety of players. Indeed, media, sports fans, athletes and academics have 122 
called for abolishment of the sport, arguing that football is now too dangerous a game to play (Findler., 123 
2015).  Recent years have seen a decline in US youth football participation. This decline is reportedly 124 
due to concerns over head injuries sustained during participation (The National Federation of State and 125 
High School Associations., 2019; Pielke., 2020). In light of this, the NFL and USA Football (USA’s 126 
AF national governing body) have taken various steps to make the sport safer. These steps include 127 
implementation of baseline concussion tests and concussion evaluations that help medics determine 128 
whether or not a concussion has occurred (McDaniel.,2019). Additionally, there are now strict ‘return 129 
to play’ policies at all levels of the sport for those athletes who have had a suspected concussion, and 130 
helmet-to-helmet hits have been banned. The ‘Heads Up Football’ tackling programme was introduced 131 
by USA Football and there is a limit on the number of full-contact practices that can take place in one 132 
season (Findler et al., 2015). However, at present, the British game has not taken the same steps to 133 
reduce injury and suppress the anxieties of those involved in its own game. Rather, it has signposted 134 
the aforementioned resources from USA Football which may not be suitable to the British game due to 135 
potentially different rates of injury compared to US AF (Bayram et al., 2020) and game day staff 136 
provision. Furthermore, BAFA’s minimum medical requirements provide basic life support only, rather 137 
than consider the inclusion of MSK injury and concussion care. This is evidenced in the concussion 138 
policy which is an educational document for the athlete (how to recognize concussion and safely return 139 
to play) rather than an informative medical policy for the medical practitioner. Yet, as seen in the 140 
aforementioned studies conducted in the UK, BAF players are at greater risk of MSK and head injury 141 
(Bayram et al., 2020) than cardiac arrest.  Thus, if the BAF game wishes to develop, steps should be 142 
taken to support player welfare in light of data from its own population. This is particularly important 143 
when smaller team rosters mean greater game time which could lead to an increase in injury incidence 144 




Study design and procedures 149 
Data reported here are part of a broader study that examined the injury profiles, reporting concussion 150 
behaviours and management of these injuries in BAF. The present data aimed to examine concussion 151 




Ethical approval was granted by Hartpury University ethics committee prior to commencing the study. 154 
Potential participants were approached via email and social media (Twitter, Facebook and Instagram) 155 
in order to reach participants nationally.  Both non-validated surveys were made available via Online 156 
Surveys and the link shared via previously stated methods. Consent to participate was required prior to 157 
proceeding with the questionnaires and participants were guaranteed that neither their identity nor their 158 
team’s identity would be disclosed. 159 
The first questionnaire explored the profile of players across leagues in BAF, their injury status and 160 
concussion reporting behaviour. This questionnaire included sections on player demographics (14 161 
questions), concussion history (6 questions) and reporting behaviour (4 questions). Data were collected 162 
from 226 participants (mean age 24.0 ± 5.7) across the BAF leagues. Participants were excluded if they 163 
were under 18 years old. The majority (83.2%) of participants reported that they had played between 0-164 
6 years of AF.  165 
Table 1 shows participant profile across the leagues. 166 
The second survey evaluated the medical provision and policy compliance in the 2019/20 BUCS AF 167 
season, and comprised of twenty four questions. This survey was completed by the BUCS club 168 
representative deemed most appropriate to complete the survey e.g. general manager, head coach or 169 
medic. Those who answered the survey participated in the sport from across the BUCS league.  170 
Thirty one teams completed this survey: Premiership (19.4%, n=6), Division 1 (35.5%, n=11) and 171 
Division 2 (45.2%, n=14).  172 
In addition to the closed questions, optional commentary sections were included at the end of each 173 
section to allow participants to expand upon their experiences. A thematic analysis was conducted to 174 
highlight the most recurrent and prominent themes. Descriptive statistics were calculated for both 175 
questionnaires. 176 
 177 
Results  178 
Concussion  179 
Concussion like symptoms were reported in over half (58.8% n=133) of participants. Of those one 180 
hundred and thirty three, 36.4% (n= 82) reported they had previously been formally diagnosed with a 181 
concussion whilst playing BAF, and 54.9% (n=54) indicated that they had experienced more than one 182 
concussion. Of those who reported experiencing concussion like symptoms, 37.8% (n=17) reported 183 
they had experienced 2 concussions per playing career, and 15.6% (n=7) reported they had experienced 184 
5 or more concussions. 185 
Just under half of participants (44.7%, n=101) reported they had suspected they’d had a concussion, 186 
however they were not formally diagnosed with one. Of these 101 participants, 52.5% (n= 53) reported 187 
this had been the case once, 28.7% (n=29) reported their suspected concussion had gone un-diagnosed 188 
twice and 5.9% (n= 6) reported that their suspected concussion had gone un-diagnosed 5 or more times. 189 
Only 32.3% of teams reported conducting baseline concussion testing each new season and fewer 190 
(22.6%) carried this out with each new player who joined the team. One team commented that they 191 
have ‘no concussion training at all’. 192 
 193 
Concussion and injury reporting behaviour 194 
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When asked about their reporting behaviour, the hiding of concussion/s from the coach or medical staff 195 
was reported by 23.5% (n=53) of participants. Yet more participants (62.8% n= 142) reported to have 196 
previously hidden injury symptoms from coaches or medical staff. Out of those players who hid their 197 
injury symptoms, 59.9% (n=85) downplayed the injury, 35.2% (n=50) ignored the injury and 4.9% (N= 198 
7) denied any injury.  199 
Medical personnel 200 
Fifty eight percent of BUCS teams reported they did not have a regular team medic. Of those who did 201 
have a regular team medic, 100% attended home games, 61.5% attended away games and 7.7% attended 202 
training.  203 
There were a range of medical personnel who attended BUCS BAF games. These included 204 
physiotherapists, graduated sports therapists, paramedics, St Johns Ambulance first aiders and a sports 205 
rehabilitator. In the majority of cases (61.3%, n=19), the highest qualification of the team medic was 206 
unknown by the club representative completing the survey.  207 
Of the 61.5% of teams who did not have a regular medic who attended training, their medical provision 208 
was provided by; a coach with first aid training (54.8%), a player with first aid training (32.3%), ‘other’ 209 
(12.9%, reported as facility/ground staff, students studying medical degrees or coaches with first aid) 210 
and 9.7% reported using an external paramedics company. 211 
When teams were asked about the confidence in their medics’ ability to safely remove a player’s helmet 212 
and pads in an emergency (e.g. access to airways) thereby preventing inadvertent movement of the head 213 
or neck which could further compromise the athlete, 22.6% reported ‘somewhat confident’ and 22.6% 214 
reported ‘unsure’. When asked about the confidence in their coaching staff to remove a player’s 215 
equipment, 35.5% reported ‘confident’ and 32.3% ‘somewhat confident.’ 216 
Positively, 83.9% reported that they would be interested in football specific first aid training.  217 
Thematic analysis 218 
The commentary of participants on medical provision highlighted some common barriers to this 219 
including; expense of hiring, the shortfall of institutional support and medical personnel with a lack of 220 
reliability and experience of the game. However, two university teams highlighted their successful use 221 
of an external business in providing medical provision, although it was acknowledged that this was 222 
uncommon. These themes will be explored further in the discussion. 223 
 224 
Discussion 225 
This preliminary study is the first to look at concussion reporting and medical provision within the BAF 226 
league, providing a grounding for further research in the field. These findings highlight some key 227 
concerns within the sport which need to be addressed by key stakeholders. As such, the results will be 228 
discussed alongside BAFA’s concussion and medical provision policies to explore the significance of 229 
these findings.  230 
Under the current BAFA concussion policy and medical provision requirements, individual teams are 231 
responsible for implementing their own medical management plans, which only need to meet BAFAs 232 
minimum requirements i.e. ensuring clubs have ‘adequate first aid cover’.  This may result in 233 
compromises in player safety when management of medical provision is left to individual teams. 234 
Indeed, one participant commented that ‘all costs are met by competitors. They choose to afford 235 
minimal coverage’ and another commented ‘I am happy with our coverage but for away games tend to 236 
have the bare minimum required’. There appear to be two issues highlighted here. Firstly, it is unfair 237 
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and unsafe to place responsibility for deciding the level of medical cover on the athlete given that they 238 
may not understand the serious implications of injury and concussion (Guskiewicz et al., 2007). 239 
Secondly, the reliance on teams to self-manage their own medical provision creates disparity within the 240 
leagues and, from the comments made, could indicate that when teams are given minimal guidance in 241 
providing medical cover, teams choose the most affordable option; minimum medical requirements. 242 
However, since ‘[home] game management is responsible for the provision and suitability of medical 243 
facilities’, travelling teams have little/no power to influence the level to which the guidelines are met. 244 
Additionally, this finding leads us to question the degree to which teams conform to the current BAFA 245 
concussion policy and their interpretation of ‘adequate first aid’ Thus, without stronger central 246 
governance there may be teams which fail to protect the safety of the players. As Malcolm (2019) states, 247 
it is sports governing bodies ethical responsibility at all sporting levels to ensure coaches comply with 248 
concussion policy. 249 
It is not uncommon for coaches to be involved in concussion management due to the rare presence of 250 
health-care practitioners during practice (Follmer et al., 2020) yet they cannot be relied upon to manage 251 
concussion injuries due to their own responsibility for the team’s success (Dillion, 2011; Partridge, 252 
2013). Research also suggests that coaches expect players to willingly put themselves at risk of injury 253 
and continue to play injured for the good of the team (Malcolm and Sheard., 2002). Thus, putting the 254 
onus on teams to manage concussion is a risk to player welfare.  255 
The diagnosis of sports related concussion is perhaps one of the most challenging tasks facing sports 256 
medicine clinicians due to the uncertainty of biological markers and the need to rely heavily on the 257 
reporting of player symptoms (McCrory et al., 2017).  Findings of this study indicate that 58.8% of 258 
participants believed they had previously had concussive symptoms, however 44.7% had not received 259 
a medical diagnosis. It is unclear whether these reported concussions occurred in training or during a 260 
game. As we see in the BUCS BAF game, there are inconsistencies in the medical provision at games 261 
and training. Further research should look to understand whether players who suspected they had a 262 
concussion chose not to disclose this or whether the inconsistencies in medical cover meant there was 263 
no one to disclose this injury to. This could also include investigations of the assessment of player’s 264 
and game-day staff’s knowledge of concussion signs and symptoms. Furthermore, baseline concussion 265 
assessment could be implemented to support diagnosis of suspected concussions (McCrory et al., 2017). 266 
Findings suggest that only 32.3% of teams carried out baseline concussion testing each season. At 267 
present, BAFA concussion policy recommends use of the Sports Concussion Assessment Tool version 268 
3 (SCAT3) in the assessment of concussion only. However, as we understand there to be inconsistencies 269 
in medical provision, implementation of SCAT in a baseline capacity might support both players and 270 
medics in the assessment of concussion and Graduated Return to Play (GRTP) process.   271 
Current BAFA concussion policy states that all those involved in the game should be aware of the signs 272 
and symptoms of concussion to allow for early recognition. Yet, as BAF is an amateur sport, it cannot 273 
be presumed that all those involved in the game are familiar with indicators of concussion. Indeed one 274 
participant noted they have ‘no concussion training at all’. Similar studies examining combat sport 275 
suggest that coaches are unfamiliar with recognising concussion prior to implementation of educational 276 
programmes and instead, source information from unreliable sources (Follmer et al., 2020). With 54.8% 277 
of teams reporting that the coach is the designated first aider at training, it would imply that (in this 278 
setting) they are the primary source of concussion and injury information. Behaviour such as this might 279 
exacerbate reliance on teams to manage concussion rather than medical professionals.  280 
All game day staff (e.g. coaches, referees) have a duty of care to their players, therefore it is their 281 
responsibility to report the suspicion of injury (including concussion) to the game day medic. However, 282 
difficulty arises when the hired medical provision cannot be relied upon. The findings from this study 283 
suggest that BAF staff have a lack of confidence in game-day medics, calling them ‘unreliable’. For 284 
example, one participant noted ‘Our AU [Athletic Union] try to use the same pool of people who 285 
gradually have developed a limited experience of the sport but subject to availability, it may sometimes 286 
be someone who has no experience of the sport or the sport-specific injuries.’ This is most concerning 287 
for the player’s welfare because a single diagnosed concussion can have considerable health 288 
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implications such as a variety of neurologic and cognitive symptoms (Edwards and Bodle, 2014). 289 
Moreover, undiagnosed concussions are associated with higher post-concussion symptoms scores and 290 
higher loss of consciousness rates with further incidences of concussion (Meehan et al., 2014). While 291 
BAF’s status as a new and emerging sport may mean that there are only a small pool of practitioners 292 
with specific and appropriate training in this field who are able to support the game, withholding 293 
medical cover raises significant questions for player welfare and duty of care.   294 
The British American Football Coaches Association (BAFCA) does not at present require coaches to 295 
have first aid certification and current BAFA concussion policy simply encourages club personnel to 296 
complete first aid courses ‘appropriate to their role’ (a statement which is open to interpretation). Yet, 297 
to rely on a first aid provision by a coach, (with presumably no medical background) to recognise a 298 
concussion is unsafe. Moreover, there may be a conflict of interest given the coach’s focus on 299 
performance. For example, one participant commented, ‘some players who were injured or had suffered 300 
illnesses felt pressured to play while recovering from injuries or while still being ill’. As evident in the 301 
findings, players are willing to hide concussion from game day staff. Moreover, coaches may be 302 
reluctant to remove a player despite recognised signs and symptoms, due to the possible detriment to 303 
team performance (Dillion, 2011). Similar concerns are held with the 32.2% of teams who reported first 304 
aid provision came through a player at practice sessions. Current BAFA policy advises that ‘clubs must 305 
ensure that they have adequate first aid cover available for all practice sessions where contact will take 306 
place’, yet what determines ‘adequate’ is unclear. Furthermore, the policy does not stipulate whether 307 
this refers to both flag-football and tackle football, as concussion occurs in both versions of the game 308 
(Kaplan et al., 2013; Prien et al., 2018). Thus, current ‘policy’ may be deemed a haphazard approach to 309 
medical cover than outline true policy directives. 310 
Despite the current BAFA concussion policy which states that ‘players must remember their duty to 311 
inform their coach of their condition and any recurrence of it’, this study shows that a ‘headstrong’ 312 
mentality (the willingness to conceal and play through injury (Liston et al., 2018)) is present in BAF. 313 
The results of this early study suggest that players may have greater respect for concussion injury when 314 
compared to the reporting of musculoskeletal injuries, as players reported they are more likely to hide 315 
injury symptoms (62.8%), whereas only 23.5% reported hiding concussion. A possible explanation for 316 
this is the increased media coverage of both the long and short term implications of repeated head 317 
trauma (Gardner et al., 2014). Another reason could be likened to copy-cat behaviour from that seen in 318 
the NFL and other contact sports played in England such as rugby, or the cultural practice of conforming 319 
to masculine norms (Kroshus et al., 2017) when playing through pain and injury are highly valued and 320 
positively reinforced (Atkinson, 2010; Fenton and Pitter, 2010). 321 
Despite the threat that concussion poses to the National Governing Body (for example potential lawsuits 322 
from players seeking compensation for medical negligence), BAFA are yet to outline a detailed policy 323 
against this potential medico-legal action. Currently, BAFA policy on concussion has been taken from 324 
existing policies in other sports. The formation of a policy unique to BAF is required and should include 325 
consideration of the leagues, as well as a clear (GRTP) process for concussion. Yet, there are difficulties 326 
with this, for despite the sports understanding and vision to professionalise the game, there is a worry 327 
that if the policy is too detailed, participation in the sport will decrease. We understand from this study’s 328 
findings that cost is a determining factor when considering the hiring of medical provision, indicating 329 
that some teams may already be financially stretched, particularly if membership numbers are low. 330 
However we should ask the question as to whether we can compromise player safety for expense. 331 
Indeed, when research suggests that UK BUCS BAF players hold 3 times the risk of acquiring a 332 
concussion during a season compared to US American football athletes (Bayram et al., 2020), action 333 
should be taken to reduce this risk. If BAFA is capable and willing to enforce rules regarding playing 334 
(including during the COVID pandemic) then we would hope that similar emphasis could be taken to 335 
address concussion policy. This is particularly important at a time when collision sports are coming 336 
under criticism for their ‘contact’ nature, but increasing participation and long term athlete development 337 
is part of BAFAs 10-year development/strategic plan. Putting medical regulations in place that ‘do 338 
enough’ but don’t restrict play are required. For example, if more rigorous medical cover regulations 339 
were put in place that included sanctions for breach of minimum medical standards, this could help 340 
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protect player safety. What this policy eventually covers requires in-depth discussion, including how 341 
compliance will be monitored. 342 
At present, the BAFA concussion policy has limited guidance for the medical practitioner with regards 343 
to GRTP following removal from the field due to concussion (i.e. who they should refer the care of the 344 
athlete to). Limitations in this current policy can be seen where teams have non-consistent medical 345 
personnel at training and games. The onus of the return to play (RTP) process is then placed upon the 346 
athlete themselves and/or the coach, neither of which may have the knowledge to safely go through the 347 
GRTP steps. As such, on game day medical practitioners (unfamiliar with the team/athlete) may 348 
experience pressures from players who dispute their diagnosis or readiness to RTP (Malcolm, 2019). 349 
Furthermore, concussion symptoms are unique to the individual (McCrory., 2017). Thus, if teams have 350 
inconsistent medical support, the recognition of these changes in a player can be tougher if the 351 
practitioner is unfamiliar with their normal behaviour e.g. recognising aggression in an athlete who is 352 
otherwise normally calm tempered. This places the medical practitioner in a difficult position and leaves 353 
them open to dispute with the athlete and coach about their removal from the game (Channon et al., 354 
2020). It is here where we see that it is the initial diagnosis rather than the rehabilitation process that 355 
becomes an issue (McNamee et al., 2016). Therefore, this may lead to practitioners feeling pressure 356 
about the decision to diagnose concussion in the first place, risking un-ethical practice (Partridge, 2014; 357 
Malcolm, 2019). As such, when forming future policy serious consideration should be given to protect 358 
both players and practitioners. 359 
Key findings suggest that only 32.3% of teams carried out baseline concussion testing each season, a 360 
method advised for interpreting suspecting post-concussion scores (McCrory et al., 2017) and 361 
advocated by other sporting bodies such as the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) 362 
(NCAA., nd). Despite literature which suggests there are limitations to the Sports Concussion 363 
Assessment Tool’s (SCAT) validity and utility, it may be of use in the GRTP of a player post-364 
concussion (Yengo-Kahn et al., 2016). However, BAFA’s concussion policy recommends the use of 365 
the SCAT-3 in the assessment of concussion only, suggesting that policy should be updated to include 366 
this new recommendation which would support player welfare. 367 
BAFA states that one of its core missions is to develop a ‘safe and enjoyable player-focused 368 
environment’ (BAFA, 2020). However the current concussion policy comes with the caveat that it is 369 
the team’s responsibility to manage concussion and its education. A regulatory body which was 370 
established (in part) for the purpose of protecting the safety of its members and whose claimed mission 371 
is to promote safe play, appears to provide meagre guidelines for its league to follow. 372 
Limitations 373 
While this material provides an illustration of the incidence of concussion and current BUCS medical 374 
provision in BAF, this study is limited by comparisons across the different leagues and number of 375 
participating teams. However these findings should not be discredited. 376 
 377 
Conclusions  378 
To the author’s knowledge, this is the first study to provide an evaluation of BAF concussion reporting 379 
and safeguarding policy. The findings provide an illustration of the incidence of concussion and current 380 
medical provision in BAF and raise questions regarding policy suitability. Through discussion of this, 381 
we provide a grounding for further research in this field in support of policy development. 382 
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Contribution to the Field Statement 392 
This article discusses the injury reporting behaviours of athletes playing American Football in the UK 393 
as well as safeguarding policy development issues we see in this sport which might impact on these 394 
reporting behaviours. Not only does this add to the critical literature of concussion in a rarely 395 
discussed sport, it highlights vital areas for policy development which would be helpful in the 396 
governing body’s need to grow and sustain safe participation in the sport.  397 
 398 
Table 1 399 
Version of Game   
 Contact/Tackle Football 197 (87.2) 
Flag/Non-tackle Football 18 (8) 
League   
 University Football 102 (45) 
Senior men’s league 74 (32.7) 
Women’s league 26 (11.5) 
National programme 16 (7.1) 
Youth league 8 (3.5) 
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